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This paper assumes heterogeneous agents with different skill levels and establishes a 
general equilibrium framework to analyze the relationship between population 
dynamics, income inequality and intergenerational mobility.  Childhood education 
level plays a key role in determining one’s skill level in adulthood. With differentiated 
educational efficiency, skilled and unskilled families behave differently in fertility 
choice and decision of child’s educational investment level. Analytical results confirm 
that the population will evolve to be more skilled with higher average income and 
lower fertility.  At the same time, wage premium decreases and social mobility 
improves. 
Skilled-biased technological change (SBTC) has been heavily used to explain the 
wage premium recently. The model extension incorporating SBTC does bring new 
insight to our analysis. Numerical simulation shows that STBC completely changes 
the wage premium pattern and significantly influences the intergenerational mobility.  
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It has been discussed in many economic studies that education plays an important role 
in shaping the income distribution and the intergenerational mobility, since it relates 
to both intergenerational efficiency and intergenerational equity.  There is a large 
literature on intergenerational transmission of education and earning (see, e.g., Becker 
and Tomes (1979), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Piketty (2000),  Mookherjee and Ray 
(2003), Davies, Zhang and Zeng (2005), Moav (2005),Docquier, Paddison and 
Pestieau (2007), and Dan and Leigh (2009)). However, it remains a challenging 
subject once considering such important factors as intergenerational transfer, 
education investment, intergenerational mobility, fertility and income inequality. 
Most of the existing discussions assume fixed fertility. By endogenizing fertility, 
agents from different incomes groups behave differently when deciding the number of 
children and level of education investment.  In addition, existing models on 
intergenerational mobility and income inequality, however, have mostly developed a 
partial equilibrium framework where the potential income of an individual agent is 
exogenous due to fixed interest and fixed wage (e.g., Fan and Zhang, 2011). While 
this omission is largely innocuous for the purpose of tractability and simplicity, 
assuming endogenous income gives additional insight into how demographic profile 
affects individual income thus education investment, given a typical relationship 





In addition, during the past two decades, most of the economies, particularly 
OECD countries, have experienced a rapid technological progress along with a 
fundamental change in the pattern of wage premium (the ratio of skilled wage to 
unskilled wage or the ratio of college graduate’s salary to high-school graduate’s 
salary).  The wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor has increased 
significantly despite the increase in the relative supply of skilled labor (college 
graduates). This somehow contradicts the conventional wisdom of supply-demand 
theory.  Acemoglu (1998) suggests that technological advancement favors skilled 
individual as it normally better enhances the productivity of skilled labor. The skill-
biased technological change (SBTC) has been widely accepted and used to explain the 
widening wage gap between skilled and unskilled individuals in developed countries 
from the 1960s. The skill-biased technological change raises the skill premium, 
rewards skill acquisition, encourages education investment, and thus influences 
intergenerational mobility at the aggregate level.  In recent decades, the skill-biased 
technological change is the driving force behind the increasing wage premium 
affecting income distribution and education investment of next generation. However, 
there is a lack of research on the relationship between skill-biased technological 
change and intergenerational mobility.   
This paper extends the model in Fan and Zhang (2011) and studies 
intergenerational mobility in a general equilibrium model that incorporates skill-
biased technological change and differential fertility with heterogeneous agents 
differentiated by their skills levels. Different from our approach, the existing literature 




wage, while the existing models on skilled-biased technological change abstract from 
the analysis of intergenerational mobility and differential fertility.  
Our analysis is based on a unified framework of population dynamics and 
income dynamics with heterogeneous agents, namely skilled and unskilled, in an 
overlapping-generation setting. The only channel for intergenerational transfer is 
through education. During each period, each agent devotes his time to working, 
rearing, and educating children. Agents receive wage from work and allocate income 
between own consumption, and physical educational investment of children. The 
education of each child requires the parental time input and physical educational 
investment while skilled parents enjoy some advantage in education, such as higher 
educational efficiency, compared to unskilled parents. The education outcome of a 
child determines the skill level during his adulthood in a probabilistic way with both 
upward and downward possibility. In the general equilibrium framework, the 
education decision and the wage level influence each other in some important ways. 
On one hand, education outcome determines demographic profile, i.e. the distribution 
of skilled and unskilled labor, in the subsequent period; the relative supply of 
skilled/unskilled labor affects the wage of different skill groups. On the other hand, 
the variation of relative income influences the education decision of each agent and 
the education outcome of next generation.  
To facilitate the analysis, we first discuss the baseline model without skill-biased 
technological change and then extend our analysis to the case with skill-biased 
technological change using simulation. In the baseline model, we will demonstrate 




of children and how the social average fertility rate and education level will be 
affected. Based on the analytical result from baseline model, we will conduct 
numerical simulation to reproduce the empirical dynamics of wage inequality and 
further explore the impact of skill-biased technological change on intergenerational 
mobility.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature. Section three sets up the general equilibrium structure of the model, 
including final goods production, education production and intergenerational 
population dynamics. Section four discusses the general equilibrium of the baseline 
model. In section five, we further extend the analysis to investigate the impact of 
skill-biased technological change. Section six concludes this thesis and the appendix 




2 Literature Review 
We now provide more details about related literature concerning intergenerational 
mobility, income inequality, wage differential, endogenous fertility, and skill-biased 
technological change. 
2.1 Intergenerational Mobility, Income Inequality and Fertility 
The research on the intergenerational correlation of economic and social status is one 
of the most important subjects in social sciences. Intergenerational mobility is quite 
often associated with income inequality and education in economic studies. There is a 
large literature on intergenerational transmission of education and earning. (see, e.g., 
Becker and Tomes(1979), Galor and Tsiddon (1997),  Mookherjee and Ray (2003), 
Davies, Zhang and Zeng (2005) and Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007)). 
However, most of existing discussions assume exogenous fertility. Becker and Lewis 
(1973) set up an analytical framework to endogenize fertility choice and study the 
trade-off between the quantity and quality of children. de la Croix and Doepke (2004) 
further study differential fertility under private and public schooling. Fan and Zhang 
(2011) endogenize the fertility choice and consider differential fertility in the 
discussion of intergenerational mobility in an overlapping-generations framework 
with skilled and unskilled individuals. In their extended model, heterogeneous agents 
with different skill levels allocate different amount of time to working and educating 
children and allocate different amount of income to own consumption and education 
investment of children. Compared with the case of equal fertility, differential fertility 




between the children from skilled and unskilled families and shed some new light on 
intergenerational mobilty.  
There is also a large literature documenting different aspects of the 
demographic transition and the relationship between income inequality and fertility, 
such as the Kuznets curve. In a seminal document of empirical regularities of 
development, Kuznets (1967) observes: “over long periods, fertility has been greater 
for the poorer and lower social status groups than for the richer and higher social 
status groups. The negative correlation between birth rates and rates of natural 
increases, on one hand, and economic status and per capita economic performance, on 
the other hand, raises problem with respect to the economic advance of the poor and 
generally less favored groups within any society.” Another significant piece of 
empirical evidence is that the transition to lower fertility rates is associated with an 
increase in the investment of child’s education. Caldwell (1980) argues that the 
beginning of fertility decline is triggered by mass education in the family economy. 
Birdsall (1983) discusses the inverse correlation between wage and fertility and also 
reveals the role of education in bringing down fertility rate.  
2.2 Wage Differential and Skill-biased Technological Change 
In the past decades, most of the OECD countries have experienced a rapid 
technological advancement along with fundamental changes in the pattern of wage 
differential. The changes in the labor market can be summarized by the following 
stylized facts (see, e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) , 




1. Wage premium decreases during the 1940s-1960s and then experiences a 
consistent increase with certain fluctuations from the 1960s onwards. The 
wage gap has grown significantly since 1980s. 
2. The relative supply of skilled labor (college graduates) and college enrollment 
increases considerably. 
3. The real wage of unskilled labor (high-school graduates) decreases despite the 
increasing relative supply of skilled labor.  
  A great deal of research has been done on the relationship between technology 
and inequality.  Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) 
argue that the increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor reveals the 
increasing demand for skilled labor and higher skilled wage caused by technological 
progress. Acemoglu (1998) reviews the fact that an exogenous increase in the supply 
of skilled labor leads to the decline in wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in 
the 1970s and suggests technological advancement enhances the relative productivity 
of skilled worker and skill-biased technological change is the driving force behind the 




3 The Basic Structure of the Model 
3.1 Production of Final Goods with Skilled and Unskilled Labor 
3.1.1 Production Function 
In this economy, the production occurs according to a neoclassical production 
function with a constant-return-to-scale:  
1
,t t DY AK H
   ,        (1) 
where tK and tH are the are the quantities of physical and composite labor input used 
in the production at time t . The technological level A is time-invariant and parameter 
(0,1) controls relative intensity of capital and composite labor in the production. 
 The internal structure of the composite labor input is expressed as follows:  
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, , ,[ ( ) (1 ) ]t D t s t u tH D L L
      ,      (2)
where ,s tL and ,u tL are the input quantities of skilled and unskilled labor at time t . tD is 
the measure of skill-biased technological process. The parameter (0,1)   controls 
the intensity with which skilled versus unskilled labor is used in the production. 
( , 1]   determines the degree of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. 
Hence, the explicit production function requires three inputs of production, namely 
capital ( K ), skilled labor ( sL ), and unskilled labor ( Lu ): 
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Total labor force at time t , denoted by
tL , is the sum of skilled and unskilled 








and the proportion of unskilled labor is 1 th . 
 Production function in per capita term is expressed as follows:  
 
1
( (1 )(1 ) )t t t t ty Ak D h h

     







 . The elasticity of technical substitution between skilled and unskilled 




















     (5) 
Since ( ,1  , we have (0, )    that affects worker productivity and skill 
intensity in the production. If 0  , i.e.   , the composite labor input function 
takes the Cobb-Douglas form as assumed in previous models (e.g. Dahan and Tsiddon 
(1998)) on wage differential e for the sake of simplicity. However, the estimates of 
 from empirical studies  range from 1.4 to 5 (see, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) and 
Ciccone and Peri (2005)). Hence, the assumption mentioned above is not realistic and 




3.1.2 Factor Price 
Suppose that the production occurs in a small open economy which takes world 
interest rate, r , as given. The small open economy permits unrestricted borrowing 
and lending from international capital markets. Production operates in a perfectly 
competitive market. The producer maximizes his profit and yields the following factor 
prices. 
 The return of capital is derived as:    
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, (1 ) (1 )[ ( ) (1 )(1 ) ] (1 ) .u t t t t t tw Ak D h h h

      


      
  (8) 
Given that the production happens in a small open economy which allows free 
capital flow. The capital level in the economy is determined by the exogenous interest 
















It is now clear that sw and uw are determined by the exogenous international interest 
rate r and by the ratio of skilled workers in the working population, th , the economy 
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 For simplicity, let us denote  
, ( ) (1 )(1 )t D t t tJ D h h
      ,      (11) 
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The wage premium is defined as the ratio between skilled labor wage and 





























It is important to note that the wage premium in this  model is not only affected 
by factor intensity of labor and the level of skill-biased technological change, but also 
by the percentage of population accounted for by skilled labor for 1  . Empirical 
studies (e.g. Ciccone and Peri (2005)) have indeed found that the rate of technical 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is not infinity, i.e. 1  . Hence, the 
wage premium will be lower when the skilled workers become a larger group in the 
population relative to unskilled workers.  However, most of the existing literature (e.g. 
Dahan and Tsiddon (1998)) on the relationship between wage inequality and 
intergenerational transition ignores such a feedback effect.  
3.2 Education Production  
The education outcome takes a Cobb-Douglas form and requires two inputs, namely a 
parental time input and a physical educational investment, differentiated between 
children from skilled versus unskilled parents. 
For a skilled worker, the education outcome for each child is given by 
1
s s s se v d
    ;         (16) 
for an unskilled worker, the education outcome for each child is  
1 ,u u u ue v d
             (17) 
where sv and uv  are the parental time spent on educating each child, sd and ud are the 
physical capital input to educate each child and s u  . (0,1)  controls the relative 




u represent the productivity factors of education production, and s u  reflects the 
empirical experience that, given the same amount of educational time and educational 
spending, the skilled parents have better educational  outcome for their children, as 
documented in the empirical literature, such as Becker (1981) and Ermisch and 
Francesconi (2002). This is due to the fact that skilled parents have the ability and 
influence family culture to enhance the learning of their children. By contrast, 
unskilled parents lack the knowhow to teach children to become skilled.    
Assumption 1. The parental time on child’s education has a lower bound v > 0.  
Also, for skilled parents, the marginal contribution of time input to child’s education 
is always positive and diminishing; while for unskilled parents, beyond the necessary 
level v , any additional time input to child’s education hardly generates any education 
output at the margin. 
The assumption reflects the very intuition that the, for unskilled parent, the lack 
of mental labor, skills and educational background makes the additional parental time 
on education beyond necessity hardly conducive to the education of children. Bianchi 
et al. (2004) survey the U.S. household data from 1965 to 2000 and find that college-
educated parents spent significantly more time on home education compared to less-
than-college-educated parents. 
3.3 Individual Preference  
This paper assumes an economy with an infinite number of overlapping generations. 
Each working generation has a mass tN and every individual lives for two periods, 




supported by his parent. In adulthood, childhood education determines the skill level 
of an individual; he receives salary from his work and decides how many children to 
bear and how much education investment for each child. There are two types of 
individuals in the economy, namely skilled and unskilled. Skilled individuals are 
better educated and receive higher wage because of higher productivity than unskilled 
individuals.     
 The preferences of both skilled and unskilled parents are identical as given 
below: 
( , , ) ln ln lnU n e c n e c    ,      (18) 
where and  are positive coefficients indicating the relative tastes for a child’s 
education outcome e and for own consumption c to the taste for the number of 
children n .  
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time and devotes it to working, 
rearing children, and educating children. We assume the time spending on rearing a 
child is the same for both skilled and unskilled parents. Parent spends   portion of his 
time rearing a child and spends v  portion of his time educating a child. The rest of the 
time is devoted to working. The labor income, (1 )n vn w  , is spent on own 
consumption c and physical educational investment d  per child. Given Assumption 1, 
an unskilled parent spends only v portion of his time on each child’s education. 
The budget constraints could be expressed in the following way: A skilled worker has




and  an unskilled worker has  
, , , , , ,(1 )u t u t u t u t u t u tc n vn w d n     .                 (20) 
Here, the product of two choice variables dn introduces non-convexity in the budget 
constraints. To ensure a concave maximizing problem, we need: 
Assumption 2. 0 1  . 
Here, we assume that the preference for the education of children is weaker 
than the preference of the number of children. Similar assumptions are adopted in 
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) and Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2003). This assumption helps to 
ensure the existence of interior solution for the individual optimization problem. It is 
verifiable that the objective of the utility maximization is concave in all the choice 
variables. 
 The lower bound v of the parental educational time is set exogenously and 
representing the minimum parental time supporting child’s education, such as home 
tutoring. Specifically, we assume that 








This assumption helps to ensure that a skilled parent is willing to spend more 
time educating their children comparing to his unskilled counterpart. 
A skilled worker maximizes his utility in (18) subject to (16) and (19). The 
constrained optimization problem could be simplified to an unconstrained one as 
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(25) 
Since both sn and sv are time-invariant, we drop the time-index hereafter.  
An unskilled worker maximizes his utility in (18) subject to(17) and (20). The 
optimization problem could be simplified to be an unconstrained one as follows: 
 
, , , , , , ,max{ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( ) ln[(1 ) ]
ln }.
u t u t u t u t u t u t u t
u
n v d n vn w d n    
 
      










, , , , ,
[( ) ]1
:
[1 ( ) ]
u t u t
u t
u t u t u t u t u t
w d
n






,     (27) 
 
,
, , , , ,
(1 )
:
[1 ( ) ]
u t
u
u t u t u t u t u t
n
d






.     (28) 























    (29)  
Since both un and uv are time-invariant, we drop the time-index hereafter as well. 
3.4 Population Dynamics 
The following notation is used to describe the population dynamics: 
tp : the probability that a child becomes skilled at time 1t  , given his parent 
is skilled at time t ; 
tq : the probability that a child becomes skilled at time 1t  , given his parent 
is unskilled at time t ; 
sn : the fertility rate of a skilled parent at time t ; 




As shown in (25) and (29), the fertility rate 
sn and un is time-invariant. Hence, 
we drop the time index for 
sn and un . The probability for a child to become a skilled 
worker is directly linked to education outcome, e .  
The functional form of ,p q are assumed as follows: 
 ,1 exp( )t s tp e   ,        (30) 
 ,1 exp( )t u tq e   .        (31) 
Both (0,1)tp  and (0,1)tq  are strictly increasing and concave functions of 
education outcome ,s te and ,u te respectively. This reflects the fact that the better 
education gives a child higher chance to become a skilled worker. Such probabilities 
lead to intergenerational mobility in this model. 
In period t , a population of size tN  with a skilled population ratio th  will have 
a demographic profile in period 1t  as follows:  
Number of skilled worker from skilled family: t s t tp n h N  
 Number of unskilled worker from skilled family: (1 )t s t tp n h N   
 Number of skilled worker from unskilled family: t u t tq n h N  
 Number of unskilled worker from unskilled family: (1 )t u t tq n h N  
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(34) 
Define the measure of intergenerational mobility as the relative odds of being skilled 





























As we will see later, this assumption helps to ensure the existence of wage 
premium between skilled and unskilled work, i.e. 
s uw w , for all the feasible value of 
th   
 A comparison of the solutions to the problems of skilled and unskilled workers 
yields: 
Proposition 1. A skilled worker has fewer children but invests a greater proportion of 
his income in education than an unskilled worker.  
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     Q.E.D 
This result has been obtained in Fan and Zhang (2011) with exogenous wage 
rates. The same result remains in our model with a different production function that 
links the wage rates as a function and skill levels of workers and the relative 




3.5 Baseline Model 
In this session, we consider the case where there is no skill-biased technological 
change. i.e. 1tD  .  
For the purpose of simplification, we denote (1 )(1 )t t tJ h h
      . 














Proof.  Refer to Appendix A.a.    
Lemma 2. Skilled workers always receive higher wage than unskilled workers: 
1
1, [0,1 exp( )]
1







    

. 
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.b. 
 It is now ready to observe the following result: 
Proposition 2: A child from a skilled family has better education outcome and has 
better chance to become a skilled worker. 
 s ue e , p q . 




 and s uw w . It follows 
immediately that s ud d . Together with s uv v v  and s ur r . This implies s ue e . 
Since ( ) 1 exp( )f x x   is an increasing function. We know p q .  




A skilled parent is willing to invest more resources than an unskilled parent, in 
the form of parental educational time and physical educational capital, in a child’s 
education. In addition, given the same educational resources, a skilled parent could 
conduct education more effectively under Assumption 1. Hence, children from skilled 
families enjoy better education and stand better chance to become skilled when 
growing up. Such results are also true with exogenous wages in Fan and Zhang 
(2011).  
A key question is how a higher proportion of skilled population influences the 
skilled and unskilled wages. 
Proposition 3. An increase in the proportion of skilled population causes a decrease 
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  .        Q.E.D. 
This implies that an increase in the skilled population will result in a decrease 
in skilled wage and an increase in unskilled wage, which reflects the fundamental rule 
of supply and demand and the law of diminishing marginal product. This result is new 
compared to models with exogenous wages such as Fan and Zhang (2011).   
Let us now look at the long run equilibrium.  
Proposition 4. There exists a stable equilibrium steady state *.h
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Hence 1th  is a strictly increasing function of th . 
 Note that 10t th h q   , and that 11t th h p   . Thus, 1th  is a 
continuous and increasing function bounded between [ , ]q p and 1p  . It is 
obvious 045  line intersects 1th   from below. So 1th  has a smaller slope than 1 at 
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 describes the income effect of a higher 









  show that the increase in the skilled population ratio 
th results in a decrease in the wage of skilled worker and an increase in the wage of 
unskilled worker. With the opposite changes in  skilled and unskilled wages, the child 
of a skilled worker will have a lower chance to become skilled but the child of 








 .  
However, by taking into account of the existing population size of skilled and 
unskilled workers, s tn h and (1 )u tn h , the increase in future skilled population from 
current unskilled families dominates the decrease in future skilled population from 
current skilled families. Overall, the income effect results in an increase  in the ratio 
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shows a positive 
impact of th on the ratio of future skilled to total owrking population. With a rise in 
the proportion of skilled labor, the next generation will become more skill-intensive 
since the offspring of skilled families will be more likely to be skilful than that of 
unskilled families, i.e. t tp q . Both of the effects above show that a higher 
percentage of skilled population in the current generation will increase the percentage 




The actual income for a skilled and an unskilled worker are 
, ,(1 )s t s s s s tI n v n w   and , ,(1 )u t u u u tI n vn w    respectively. The average income 
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.    (43) 
 The implications of a higher ratio of skilled to working population for average 
income and average fertility of the economy are: 
Proposition 5: A higher percentage of skilled to working population leads to higher 
average income but lower fertility. 
Proof.   Differentiating (43) with respect to th leads to 
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As shown in the proof of lemma 2, 1 1(1 )(1 ) 0t th h






 Average fertility could be expressed as (1 )t s t uh n h n  . Since s un n , we 
have 
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Even though an increase in the skilled population will result in a decrease of 
skilled wage and an increase of unskilled wage, the increase of unskilled wage 
generates a  dominating effect and leads to the increase of average wage. 
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We can see that the variance of income is determined by two factors: the product of 
the skilled and unskilled proportions, (1 )t th h , and the wage gap, s uw w .   
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Based on (46),  Figure 1 shows the evolution of income inequality resembling 
the Kuznets curve with an inverted U pattern. Many existing literature (Galor and 
Zeira (1993)) derives the Kuznets curve under the framework of exogenous wage. 






Figure 1. Kuznets Curve 
 Let us consider how a higher starting ratio of skilled to working population 
affects intergenerational mobility. 





 .   

























This result is intuitive. As discussed earlier, an increase in the skilled population 
percentage will cause a decrease of skilled wage and an increase of unskilled wage, 
which is an important channel for intergenerational mobility yet ignored in existing 
studies with fixed wages. Children from unskilled families will receive more physical 
education investment and enjoy better education outcome, while children in skilled 
families will receive less physical education investment and worse education 
outcome. Hence, starting from a higher ratio of skilled to working population,  
children from unskilled families have better chance to become skilled and children 
from unskilled families have less chance to become skilled when growing up. Even 
though it is still true that children from skilled families still enjoy better education 
compared to those from unskilled families, the educational inequality is declining. 









4 The Model with Skill-biased Technological Change 
In this section, we will present a model that can reproduce some empirical dynamics 
of income inequity and education by incorporating skill-biased technological change. 
We set up the simulation framework similar to that in Ábrahám (2008). The 
skill-biased technological progress is an exogenous process measured by tD , and it is 
assumed to follow such a process: 
1t tD D  ,         (47) 
where 1tD  and 1 , this shows that skill-biased technical change enhances the 
return of skilled workers and grows in an accumulative pattern.  
The following table displays the parameters used in the simulation 




      0D  r    s  u            v  
0.6 0.55 0.3 1 0.1 1.5 8 2.5 0.5 8 2.5 0.5 0.05 0.05 
Table 1. Parameter for simulation under skill-biased technological change 
 Figure 2 shows the evolution of skilled wage premium 





Figure 2. Evolution of wage premium under skill-biased technological change 

















where there are 
two factors affecting wage premium. First, the increase in the supply of skilled labor 











. Second, skill-biased 
technological change directly enhances the return of skilled labor, represented by the 
term tD
 . In the early stage, the supply-demand relationship plays a major role in 
wage determination and leads to a decrease in wage premium. When skill-biased 
technology accumulates to a certain level, the relative wage of skilled worker starts to 
increase in a steady manner. The result of this simulation also reassembles the wage 




Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) , Berman, Bound and Machin 
(1998)).  
 In addition, technological change also has a direct impact on the marginal 
productivity of unskilled labor. Since skilled and unskilled labor are complementary 
inputs in this simulation, as 0 1  , the increase in the supply of skilled labor will 
increase the marginal productivity of unskilled labor. Moreover, the decrease in the 
unskilled labor proportion, 1 th , will enhance the marginal productivity of unskilled 
worker because it becomes more scarce.  
 




Figure 3 shows an interesting pattern of the response of intergenerational 
mobility to a rising ratio of skilled population. The first increase in the social mobility 
is explained by the higher relative wage of unskilled worker so that an unskilled 
family has more resources to spend in the education. The additional unit of physical 
educational investment gives considerable return to an unskilled family when the 
education investment level is low, hence social mobility improves. Thereafter, the 
social mobility is slightly worse off when the wage premium begin to increase: the 
turning point coincides with the turning point of wage premium. This is due to the 
significant increase of skilled wage when the accumulation of skill-biased 
technological change is strong enough. Skilled family starts to increase the spending 
in the physical education investment. This reduces downward mobility of children 
from skilled families and thus slightly depresses the social mobility.   
However, through the Cobb-Douglas form of education function, the constant 
increase in the physical capital education investment suffers from diminishing return. 
The persistent increase of skilled wage does not translate into a significant decline of 
downward mobility for children in skilled families. On the other hand, the increase in 
the unskilled wage and the corresponding increase of physical education investment 
in unskilled families improve their child’s upward mobility, as the physical education 
investment level is still low for the unskilled family. Hence social mobility improves 




5 Conclusion  
Intergenerational mobility and income inequality attract great attention from both 
economists and politicians. Income gap and intergenerational mobility are interrelated 
and affect the social equity of current and next generation. The widening income gap 
across skilled and unskilled individuals could be driven by skill-biased technological 
change, while education is a key determinant of intergenerational mobility. To better 
explain the intergenerational mobility, one should develop a comprehensive 
understanding of education, intergenerational transfer, endogenous fertility, 
population dynamics, and wage premium. Hence, this paper develops a general 
equilibrium model that incorporates skill-biased technological change and differential 
fertility with heterogeneous agents differentiated by their skills levels to analyze 
fertility, education investment, income inequality and intergenerational mobility.  
Under some reasonable assumptions, the baseline model shows that, when 
facing the trade-off between quantity and quality of child, skilled worker has fewer 
children but invests a greater proportion of their income and time in education than an 
unskilled worker. Since the skilled parents have some advantage in educating a child, 
they are more willing to invest in educating next generation, both in the form of 
educational time and physical capital. Hence, a child from a skilled family has better 
education outcome and has a better chance to become a skilled worker in his 
adulthood. When the economy develops towards a higher proportion of skilled 
population, average fertility decreases, average income increases, and the evolution of 




improves when the skilled group becomes larger, as the relative increase of unskilled 
wage gives the poor child better education resources.  
We further extend the baseline model to incorporate skill-biased technological 
change and conduct numerical simulation to reproduce the empirical dynamics of 
wage inequality and further explore the impact of skill-biased technological change 
on intergenerational mobility. Different from the previous case, intergenerational 
mobility generally improves but with some setbacks along the way. This setbacks 
arises from the endogenous response of wage premium the a rising ratio of skilled to 
working population.  
The results in this paper are based on the assumptions which simplify the 
model. One may try to investigate the relationship between education and 
technological progress and endogenize skill-biased technological change. This will 
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A.b  Skilled workers always receive higher wage than unskilled workers: 
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